



"To care for him who has borne the battle, and for his widow and orphan."

ESTABLISHED 1877.—NEW SERIES.

WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, MAY 17, 1883.

VOL. II—NO. 40.—WHOLE NO. 92.

## ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

Its Organization on Arlington Heights, Virginia.

## PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

The Army Astride the Chickahominy.

## JACKSON'S DIVERSION.

Battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks.

I.  
The Army of the Potomac, now holding its Fourteenth Annual Reunion in this city, has a history unsurpassed in glorious achievements. In patient endurance of hardship; in prompt, unswerving obedience to its commanders; in heroic constancy to principle; in exalted courage in action, the survivors of that magnificent army may claim rank with the soldiers of Thermopylae, Marathon and Bunker Hill. Through all the vicissitudes of a protracted conflict with a bold and aggressive enemy, from defeat at Bull Run to final triumph at Appomattox, it bore its honorable part in crushing the most powerful rebellion recorded in the history of nations.

In no other war of equal magnitude can victory be so fairly claimed by the rank and file of the army, and in none can defeat so surely be traced to the incompetency of its commanders. A Nation in arms, it represented every profession and handicraft and every phase of politics and religion. Men of genius and wealth tented with the obscure and lowly, all animated by a common sentiment, contented by common danger, and inspired by a common faith in the justice of their cause. Thus triply armed in the panoply of those who have their quarrels just, they stood for four years a living wall between the Confederate army, ably officered and equally well disciplined, and the National Capital. With the exception of two attempts made by their opponents to carry the war into the Northern States, the theater of operations of the Army of the Potomac was Virginia. Both efforts to release that State from the grip of the Union army ended in disaster to the Confederates, who retired from the hard-contested fields of Antietam and Gettysburg to reorganize their exhausted energies and rally their depleted ranks, behind the Rappahannock. As the objective point of the Army of the Potomac was Richmond, so was that of the Army of Northern Virginia, Washington. The Government of the United States and the Confederacy, like two mighty chess players, having their kings well to the front, expended all their energies in protecting them in that exposed position. Separated by little over one hundred miles of territory, the two capitals stood like towering battlements overlooking the field of battle. In this narrow space were fought most of the great battles of the war—Bull Run, Seven Pines, Fair Oaks, Gaines Mill, Malvern Hill, Cedar Mountain, Groveton and Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, The Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and a multitude of engagements of less magnitude.

It is well, perhaps, for the prosperity of the United country that the scars of war were confined to narrow limits. Had the capitals of the contending forces been more widely separated the area of devastation would have been increased and the healing process proportionately retarded.

THE FIRST ENGAGEMENT.  
The untiring success of the Union arms in Western Virginia had prepared the Northern people for a corresponding success on the Potomac, and when General McDowell, at the head of 30,000 raw and undisciplined volunteers, marched out from his camp at Arlington Heights to attack Beauregard at Manassas, little doubt was entertained that Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford were to be repeated on a larger scale. It is but fair to the commander whose star set on the field of Bull Run to add that he did not share the rose-colored anticipations of victory that illuminated the horizon of Washington. He knew how easily the Confederates, fighting on interior lines, connected by a network of railroads, could re-enforce a threatened point, but was assured that General Butler would take care of the Confederate forces on the Peninsula, and that Johnston's forces in the Shenandoah Valley should be held there by General Patterson, leaving him to cope with Beauregard single handed. Accordingly, General Patterson, with a force of 18,000 men, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on the 22d of July and took position at Martinsburg. Johnston then held fast at Winchester with 8,000 men. Instead of resorting to the most effective method of preventing the union of Johnston and Beauregard, which would doubtless have been by moving up and attacking him, General Patterson remained at Martinsburg until the 15th, when he advanced to Dunker Hill, whence, on the 17th, he fell off to Charlottesville, near Harper's Ferry, leaving Johnston free to form a junction with Beauregard.

"IF YOU WISH TO HELP ME, NOW IS THE TIME."  
was Beauregard's laconic message to Johnston, who, making a rapid flank march by way of Ashby's Gap, took care at Piedmont and reached Manassas with his advance brigades in time to insure the defeat of McDowell in this the first engagement of the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia.

Every one can recall the thrill of rage, disappointment and mortification with which he received the news as it flashed over the telegraphic wires of the utter rout of the Union army at Bull Run. The writer heard the telegram read in an interior town in the State of Kentucky by a Confederate recruiting officer, who took occasion to remark at its close: "That proves what I have said—the Yankees won't fight," which sentiment was received by his admiring friends with continuous rounds of applause. Yet, when viewed in the light of the record, the Union and Confederate reports agree that Beauregard could not have held his position half an hour longer but for the arrival of Johnston's division.

What would have been the effect of wiser generalship and more aggressive movements in the summer of 1861 upon the final issue of the war it is impossible to determine. An overwhelming defeat at Bull Run, followed by an

immediate advance of the troops under Patterson on the right, Butler on the left and McDowell in the center, must have resulted in the capture of Richmond, as a similar advance in the West would have driven the Confederates south of the Tennessee. But it is questionable whether a sudden and overpowering defeat to the Confederates would have brought about the grand results finally attained.

The country was not yet ready for a proclamation of emancipation, and if at any time previous to the 1st of January, 1863, the rebels had laid down their arms the freedom of the slaves would not have been made a condition of accepting their surrender. It was assumed by many that slavery, being a national crime, required a national expiation. Blind instruments in the hands of Providence to work out eternal decrees, the soldiers of the Union were to wash away the stain upon the national escutcheon with their blood.

THE EFFECT OF BULL RUN.  
To the eternal honor of the American name be it written that, the first stunning effects of the reports of failure at Bull Run being over, the country arose majestically to meet the emergency presented. The spirit of patriotism had evoked their surrender in April when the flag of the Union had been fired upon at Fort Sumter, but the spontaneous enlistments in the army after Bull Run showed that the manhood of the Northern people had been humiliated, and now they were ready to vindicate their right to control the destinies of the Republic. Three months' troops re-enlisted, and scores of new recruits entered the field for three years or during the war.

There was no lack of men, nor of money, nor of munitions of war. An army was soon in the field, but when the country could not furnish an army from the raw material collected on the spot, the Government displaced General McDowell, who had lost his first battle through no fault of his own, and conferred the command of the entire army upon a general who, through the efficiency and soldierly qualities of a subordinate officer, had won a succession of victories in comparatively minor engagements in Western Virginia. General McClellan undertook the herculean task of moulding an army from the raw material collected on the spot, the Government displaced General McDowell, who had lost his first battle through no fault of his own, and conferred the command of the entire army upon a general who, through the efficiency and soldierly qualities of a subordinate officer, had won a succession of victories in comparatively minor engagements in Western Virginia. General McClellan undertook the herculean task of moulding an army from the raw material collected on the spot, the Government displaced General McDowell, who had lost his first battle through no fault of his own, and conferred the command of the entire army upon a general who, through the efficiency and soldierly qualities of a subordinate officer, had won a succession of victories in comparatively minor engagements in Western Virginia.

ON TO RICHMOND.  
The memory of Bull Run still too vivid to allow an assault to be made, and greatly to the surprise of General Magruder, his powerful antagonist made no other attempt than that mentioned to break through his lines. The road to Richmond now being open, the soldiers of the army turned their faces hopefully towards the Confederate capital. Then followed the battle of Williamsburg, the retreat of Johnston, and the toilsome pursuit, until, on the 10th of May, the advance divisions encamped at White House, at the head of navigation on the Pamunkey, where a railroad, running from the York River to Richmond, offered a convenient place of supplies.

IN THE MEANTIME the Confederate congress, by the passage of the conscription act, had placed Mr. Davis in control of the military resources of the South, and re-enforcements poured into Richmond by every train. They were at once transferred to the army, their smugly ensconced behind the Chickahominy. The skillful general who had managed to hold in check the Army of the Potomac and, by withdrawing in the nick of time from Yorktown and Williamsburg, saved his army, finding himself menaced by an army in his front and the sea in his rear, determined to refuse battle until it was forced upon him by an advance of either McClellan or McDowell. The new order of command of the latter, including Shields' division, detached from Banks' corps, amounted to 41,000 men and 100 guns.

THE 26th of May was fixed as the date of junction of the two armies, and to this end McClellan pushed his right wing well forward and McDowell advanced eight miles south of Fredericksburg. Porter's corps was advanced by McClellan to Hanover Junction, where it encountered and defeated General Branch and established the right wing of the Army of the Potomac within fifteen miles of the city. The march of McDowell's, who in turn was ordered to advance. Readers of THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE will recall the account given some months since of the repulse of Jackson, by General Nathan Kimball, in command of Shields' division, at Winchester, on March 27th, and his pursuit up the Valley of the Shenandoah to his old eyrie in the Blue Ridge beyond Harrisonburg. Here he received re-enforcements which augmented his command to 15,000 men Banks' force, on the contrary, reduced by the detachment of Shields' division to about 5,000, was posted at Harrisonburg.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.  
The threatened junction of McClellan and McDowell rendered a diversion necessary, and Banks' exposed position in the Shenandoah Valley furnished the opportunity. General Milroy, in command of one of Fremont's brigades on its way to re-enforce Banks, was attacked and driven back by Jackson, who had left General Ewell to watch Banks, who, perceiving his danger, withdrew to Strasburg. Jackson, having joined Ewell after defeating Milroy, followed rapidly, captured Kenly's First Maryland regiment, after a hard fight, at Front Royal, and came upon Banks at Winchester, who, after such resistance as a small force could make against superior numbers, retired hastily to the north bank of the Potomac, making a march of fifty-three miles in forty-eight hours.

capital should be left to cover Washington. In conformity with this was precaution, seventy-three thousand men, under command of General Banks and Wadsworth, were posted as follows: 15,000 in garrison in front of Washington; 7,780 at Warrenton; 10,859 at Manassas; 35,467 in the Shenandoah Valley, and 1,350 on the lower Potomac. The mountain department had been created and General Fremont assigned to command, to which was added General Blenker's division, which had been designed to accompany McClellan, and, at the last moment, the President decided upon the detachment of McDowell's corps, which was retained on the line of the Rappahannock. The move against Richmond from the lower Chesapeake was undertaken against the judgment of President Lincoln and at no time received the hearty support of the War Department. He had relied on the powerful armament of the naval vessels to destroy the water batteries while he attacked the forts at Yorktown and Gloucester Point from the rear. His force was landed on the peninsula, whence it was his intention to move upon the rear of the works at Yorktown while the corps of McDowell performed the same service in the rear of the works at Gloucester Point.

Upon application of Flag Officer Goldsboro, he was informed that the naval force could be spared for that purpose, since he regarded the vessels as too strong for his available vessels. Defeated in this expectation, McClellan was doomed to the same disappointment with regard to McDowell. On the very day he arrived at Yorktown he was met by an order detaching McDowell's corps, which, being the last to embark at Alexandria, he supposed was on its way to join him.

The alternative was presented of breaking the lines stretching across the peninsula or settling down to a siege of Yorktown. A weak spot being found, four companies of Vermont troops were pushed across the Warwick by way of breast-works, under cover of an artillery fire. They drove the Confederates from their rifle pits, and were re-enforced by eight additional companies. The Confederates, on retiring, received re-enforcements, and, by a successful countercharge took their first position, driving the Union troops into the stream, where many of them were killed. The Vermont troops had held the position nearly an hour entirely unsupported, and there was nothing to prevent a brigade or a division, if necessary, being sent to their support. Then followed the "Siege of Yorktown," which terminated on the 6th of May, by the discovery that the works were untenable, the Confederates having quietly vacated them and fallen back towards Richmond. When McClellan first landed on the peninsula Magruder's force was 11,000 men—6,000 in garrison at Yorktown and Gloucester Point and 5,000 stretched out over a line thirteen miles in extent. This force was subsequently increased, but at no time amounted to more than one-half the numerical strength of McClellan's army.

JOHNSON SEIZES THE OPPORTUNITY.  
"The Confederate commander was not the man to let slip such an opportunity; and, as soon as reconnaissance had fully developed the position of that portion of the Union army which lay on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy, he determined to act. It was a situation in which, by bringing two-thirds of his own force to bear against one-third of the Union force, he might hope not merely to defeat an assault, but to make a rout. By the 20th of May he had formed his plan, and he immediately made preparations for carrying it into effect on the following day. During the night of the 30th there came a storm of unrelenting violence; and this circumstance, while it would embarrass the execution of Johnston's proposed plan, at the same time gave that general the hope of making the operation still more complete from the situation in which it would place his opponent.

The reconnaissance of the Confederates had disclosed the fact that Casey's division of Keyes' corps held an advanced position on the Williamsburg road, three-quarters of a mile beyond the point known as Seven Pines and about six miles from Richmond. Casey's division, of the same corps, was stationed at Seven Pines, on both sides of the Williamsburg road and along the Nine-mile road, his right resting at Fair Oaks Station, on the Richmond and York River Railroad. Of the two divisions of Heintzelman's corps, that of Kearney was on the Williamsburg road and the railroad, three-quarters of a mile in advance of Savage Station; and that of Hooker was guarding the approaches of the White Oak Swamp.

"In this state of facts, Johnston made the following dispositions for attack: Hill (D. I.), who had been covering the Williamsburg and Charles City road, was directed to move his division, supported by the division of Longstreet, out on the Williamsburg road, but not to move Hill's division, which was to strike the flank of the Union force which Hill and Longstreet sought to engage in front. G. W. Smith, with his division, was to advance on the right, and the Union force, to the junction of the New Bridge road with the Nine-mile road, there to be in readiness either to fall on Keyes' right or to cover Longstreet's left. The divisions were to move at daybreak; but the wretched condition of the roads, resulting from the storm, greatly retarded the movement of the troops. Hill, Longstreet, and Smith, indeed, were in position by 8 o'clock; but not so Huger. For hours after hour, Longstreet and Hill awaited in vain for the signal gun that was to announce Huger's arrival in his proper position. At length, at 10 o'clock, Hill went forward on the Williamsburg road, and presently struck Casey's division. Held by that officer, was defended by a redoubt, rifle-pit, and abatis; but, at this time, these works were only in process of construction, and the troops were, indeed, engaged at this work when the attack was made. The pickets were quickly driven in, and the more so that a regiment, sent forward to support the picket-line, gave way without making much if any resistance. The first blow fell upon Nagle's brigade, which held a position in advance of the redoubt, where it made a good fight, and held the enemy in check for a considerable time, and then retired and fought with the rest of the division in the redoubt and rifle-pits—the force being strengthened by Peck's brigade, sent forward by General Couch. The Confederates advanced in close columns, and suffered severely from the batteries in front of and in the redoubt. Presently, however, one of the brigades, which had been sent round on the left of Casey, gained the rear of the redoubt. When, therefore, a severe flank fire was opened by the force that had made this detour, the division crumbled away, the guns in the redoubt and a portion of those of the battery in front were captured, and such of the troops as held together were brought to a stand at General Couch's position at Seven Pines.

"Early in the action, General Keyes, whose troops were those upon whom the attack had thus far fallen, finding he was being hard pushed, had sent to General Heintzelman, who

(Continued on 7th page.)

ional credit and prevent foreign interference, when the heart of the President had been sickened by long and tedious delays, in which the gloom had been lightened only by the victories in the West, when the prize of the Confederate capital was within the grasp of the Union armies, the President, yielding to the clamor of the timid souls about him, who professed to believe that the capital was in danger of capture by Jackson, withdrew McDowell and sent him off upon a fruitless chase after Stonewall Jackson, a hundred miles away.

THE ARMY ASTRIDE THE CHICKAHOMINY.  
In moving forward from Williamsburg, McClellan had chosen the line of the York River, for the excellent reason that each day's march brought him nearer McDowell's corps. The Chickahominy, which Swinton describes as a "wet ditch in front of Richmond," was not fordable, and there were few bridges. Across one of these, Bottoms, he threw Casey's division on the 20th of May, followed by the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman, leaving Sumner's, Porter's and Franklin's corps on the left bank.

The time for vigorous and skillful work by the bridge builders had now come. With his army divided by a deep stream, no time should have been lost in constructing sufficient bridges to enable the remaining corps to cross and recross at will, but right they stayed by before two bridges were built in front of Sumner's corps, and up to the 31st no provision had been made for the crossing of the right wing of the army. In case of an attack upon the portion of the army already crossed, a detour of twenty-three miles would be required for Porter's corps to reach the field or re-enforce him in case he was attacked. The stream flows through a belt of heavily timbered swamp, inundated during the spring freshets to an extent of several miles in width, and even when not inundated the ground is spongy and impassable for artillery or heavy loads. Mr. William Martin, in his "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," gives the following description of the battles of Fair Oaks and Seven Pines:

"In this state of facts, McClellan's disposition of his army must be considered a grave fault, and inaction in such a situation was in the highest degree dangerous. 'A general,' says the Archduke Charles, 'must suppose that his opponent will do against him whatever he ought to do.' Now, for Johnston to omit to strike one or the other of these exposed wings, was to neglect that principle which forms the basis of all military action, and to neglect an enemy at the point of collision was to neglect a unique opportunity of delivering a decisive blow.

A RAPID RIDE TO MILLEN.  
A little after daylight we stopped at a farmhouse where there was corn and fodder for our horses, and rested an hour or so. While the boys made coffee to sustain us, the "band," the servants of the house brought us some sweet potatoes and a little bacon, which gave us a good breakfast. Shortly after sunrise we were again in the saddle, having ridden within the past twenty-four hours over sixty miles. During the night we had passed several towns, the names of which we did not know; but the negroes told us we were still forty miles from Millen.

During the forenoon we made good progress, meeting with no opposition. About the many houses, we passed we saw no one but now and then some old gray-headed man walking about the house, looking at us as we passed. Their sons and their sons' sons were all in the rebel service. At noon we made another short stop to feed and water. Here we in some way got the impression that the prisoners had been sent away from Millen, but could not altogether credit the report, but as we advanced the evidence became more conclusive. About 4 o'clock we came in sight of the prison pen in which our poor boys had suffered so keenly—even death itself. How our hearts leaped with joy at the sight, and the thought that we should be able to effect their release!

Millen is situated on the Savannah and Charleston Railroad, and the stockade is some distance to the north and near the branch road running to Augusta. Maj. Eatis, with his scouts, made a reconnaissance, capturing the guard, some thirty that had been left behind,—who informed us that the prisoners had been removed the Tuesday before, and that most of the officers had been sent to Columbia, S. C., while the privates had been taken south on the Gulf Railroad. After destroying the stockade and its surrounding buildings, Major Eatis, with his command, as ordered, joined Kilpatrick south of Waynesboro', and participated in the engagement near that place.

ENCOUNTERING WHEELER'S CAVALRY.  
Kilpatrick, who had made a detour to the northeast, feinting on Augusta, but trying in the mean time to reach and destroy the important railroad bridge and trestle-work at Briar Creek, near Waynesboro', half way between Augusta and Millen, hearing that the Union prisoners had been removed from Millen, renewed the march by one of the principal roads towards Augusta, giving it out that the army was advancing on that city. After he had passed the Ogeechee Shoals, Wheeler heard of his movements and rapidly concentrated his force, which was then superior to Kilpatrick's as to numbers, and took position on the south of Briar Creek Swamp. Kilpatrick, in obedience to his orders, turned the head of his column to the right upon the road running from Warrington to Waynesboro', and was well on his way to the latter place before Wheeler was aware of it. But Wheeler, learning of his whereabouts, attacked him at 12 o'clock at night, and the Eighth Texas and Eighth Illinois coming together in the darkness got badly mixed up in the fight. The latter regiment was driven into its reserve, and when the enemy withdrew quite a number of the Eighth Texas found themselves prisoners in his hands.

Wheeler, following up, attacked the next morning, but gained nothing, except that Kilpatrick was obliged to abandon, for the time being, the burning of the Briar Creek bridge and turn southward from Waynesboro' after destroying a few miles of railroad. On the 27th Major Eatis, with his command, joined the division near Waynesboro', and Kilpatrick, upon hearing the result of the expedition, resolved to rejoin the army about Louisville. That morning Murray's brigade moved to the front, while Atkins, with his command, became rear guard, each brigade taking advantage of the brunt of the contesting fight with Wheeler.

## THE MARCH TO THE SEA.

Kilpatrick's Cavalry on the March Through Georgia.

## A SCOUT TO MILLEN.

An Engagement with Wheeler's Cavalry near Waynesboro'.

## GALLANT SABER CHARGE.

A Graceful Act of Courtesy Performed by General Wheeler.

By J. B. Kilbourne.

By the 23d of November both wings of the army had arrived in and about Milledgeville, having accomplished the first stage of the movement within the seven days designated, and on the 24th Sherman renewed the march, pivoting slowly southeastward and following the river courses by six parallel roads leading towards Millen, while the main body of the cavalry, in order to cover and shield the movement, was sent eastward towards Warrington and in the direction of Augusta.

Kilpatrick, after crossing the Oconee River, rested his men and horses until the supply train came up, but started again at 11 o'clock that night, despite the fact that they had marched thirty miles that day and both man and beast were fatigued. At daylight they were twenty miles away, but before leaving a detail of twelve men from each company—those who had best horses being selected—was made and placed under command of Major Eatis, General Kilpatrick's adjutant-general, who was to start on a special expedition at 12 o'clock that night and make a forced march to rescue the Union soldiers then prisoners at Millen, seventy-five miles distant. So, after feeding and resting our jaded horses and obtaining a fresh supply of ammunition, we got off before midnight. The command was unnumbered with wheels. The roads were dry, and it was a bright moonlight night. Little suspecting the object of the expedition we silently moved on during the long night through forest and towns, with nothing to break the silence save the tread of the horses or clatter of our sabers and sound of the bugle to dismount and lead our horses on coming to a stream, and then to close up and move on. So fatigued were some of the men that they would fall asleep and ride for miles quite unconscious.

A little after daylight we stopped at a farmhouse where there was corn and fodder for our horses, and rested an hour or so. While the boys made coffee to sustain us, the "band," the servants of the house brought us some sweet potatoes and a little bacon, which gave us a good breakfast. Shortly after sunrise we were again in the saddle, having ridden within the past twenty-four hours over sixty miles. During the night we had passed several towns, the names of which we did not know; but the negroes told us we were still forty miles from Millen.

During the forenoon we made good progress, meeting with no opposition. About the many houses, we passed we saw no one but now and then some old gray-headed man walking about the house, looking at us as we passed. Their sons and their sons' sons were all in the rebel service. At noon we made another short stop to feed and water. Here we in some way got the impression that the prisoners had been sent away from Millen, but could not altogether credit the report, but as we advanced the evidence became more conclusive. About 4 o'clock we came in sight of the prison pen in which our poor boys had suffered so keenly—even death itself. How our hearts leaped with joy at the sight, and the thought that we should be able to effect their release!

Millen is situated on the Savannah and Charleston Railroad, and the stockade is some distance to the north and near the branch road running to Augusta. Maj. Eatis, with his scouts, made a reconnaissance, capturing the guard, some thirty that had been left behind,—who informed us that the prisoners had been removed the Tuesday before, and that most of the officers had been sent to Columbia, S. C., while the privates had been taken south on the Gulf Railroad. After destroying the stockade and its surrounding buildings, Major Eatis, with his command, as ordered, joined Kilpatrick south of Waynesboro', and participated in the engagement near that place.

ENCOUNTERING WHEELER'S CAVALRY.  
Kilpatrick, who had made a detour to the northeast, feinting on Augusta, but trying in the mean time to reach and destroy the important railroad bridge and trestle-work at Briar Creek, near Waynesboro', half way between Augusta and Millen, hearing that the Union prisoners had been removed from Millen, renewed the march by one of the principal roads towards Augusta, giving it out that the army was advancing on that city. After he had passed the Ogeechee Shoals, Wheeler heard of his movements and rapidly concentrated his force, which was then superior to Kilpatrick's as to numbers, and took position on the south of Briar Creek Swamp. Kilpatrick, in obedience to his orders, turned the head of his column to the right upon the road running from Warrington to Waynesboro', and was well on his way to the latter place before Wheeler was aware of it. But Wheeler, learning of his whereabouts, attacked him at 12 o'clock at night, and the Eighth Texas and Eighth Illinois coming together in the darkness got badly mixed up in the fight. The latter regiment was driven into its reserve, and when the enemy withdrew quite a number of the Eighth Texas found themselves prisoners in his hands.

(Continued on 7th page.)

## CUTTING THEIR WAY THROUGH.

During the forenoon Kilpatrick, with his staff and escort, was in the rear, following at some distance, with General Atkins' rear guard watching the enemy's movements. Wheeler had sent Anderson's brigade, early in the morning, around on our right with instructions to place his command on our flank, and, if possible, divide our column before we could reach Buckhead Creek, five miles distant. Our rear guard had just passed the cross-road when Anderson's advance came up on the run and placed themselves in single line across the road in our rear and commenced firing.

Kilpatrick seeing that he was cut off, led his men on at once in a charge with the saber and cut his way through. Anderson, knowing there was a large causeway and bridge at Buckhead Creek crossing, pressed us vigorously up to that point and while we were crossing, Colonel Heath, with his regiment, was the first to cross, and took a good position on the opposite bank, and with his two howitzers checked the rebel advance until the division could cross when he attempted to burn the bridge, but was only successful in part, for Anderson soon crossed it after us, while Wheeler, with the balance of his command, crossed at a ford below. Kilpatrick now moved forward three miles and took a strong position at Reynolds' plantation. Here Wheeler attacked in force, but was decisively repulsed.

A NIGHT OF ANXIETY.  
Advancing through an open field on our barricades his division held their fire until they were within short carbine range, and then opened with both artillery and small arms. The left and center being finally driven back, reformed and moved around on our left flank, when Kilpatrick fell back across the open field in columns of regiments, preserving our line of frontage, and again formed line of battle under cover of the woods, keeping up a brisk skirmish fire until the darkness closed the engagement. He then drew back three miles further and went into camp. By some misunderstanding between Colonel Sanderson and Captain Cockley, a staff officer of Kilpatrick's, the rear of our camp was left exposed, without any picket, and it was not until the officer of the day made his "grand round" that the mistake was discovered. The Ninety-second was at once sent out and the horses of the division remained saddled all night, for we expected another night attack. Had Wheeler known the situation of our lines up to this hour he could have marched his division into our camp and, for I ought to know, taken the most of our prisoners there that night of anxiety. The next day their position was changed, for Wheeler, having received re-enforcements by way of Augusta, outnumbered us two to one. Anderson, who during the day had held the advance, afterwards boasted, as we learned from prisoners, that he had routed Kilpatrick, causing him to fly in confusion, with a loss of nearly two hundred killed, wounded and prisoners. General Anderson was simply mistaken, for he took no prisoners, and as we fought mainly protected by barricades, the loss in killed and wounded was correspondingly small, while his force was fully two hundred killed and wounded in the engagement at Reynolds' plantation. During the next day we arrived at Louisville, without much opposition. Kilpatrick now rested his horses for a day or so, during which time the Fourteenth Corps came up, and then obtained permission from General Sherman to deliver Wheeler a return blow.

RETURNING THE COMPLIMENT.  
On the 1st of December, supported by General Baird's division, Kilpatrick again returned and attacked Wheeler near Waynesboro'. The night before the battle, having camped near a plantation in a beautiful pine forest, our pickets were attacked at several points, and there was more or less firing all night. At midnight Wheeler commenced shelling our camp at long range. The first shell struck one of the men on picket and literally tore him to atoms. At 3 o'clock we were again in the saddle. Baird's division had come up during the evening and had gone into camp a half mile in our rear, and while we were saddling up we could hear their drums beating reveille. Waynesboro' lay about three or four miles north of us, on the branch railroad leading to Augusta, and between us and the town ran a branch of Briar Creek, on this side of which Anderson's brigade lay, protected by a good barricade, commencing at the cut on the railroad on their left and extending around to the swamp on their extreme right. Wheeler's main force and artillery were across the creek, nearly a half mile in their rear. Long before daylight Kilpatrick formed his division in line of battle, supported by Baird, and moved out to our picket line, with Atkins' brigade in the center, the Ninth Michigan on the right and Ninety-second Illinois mounted infantry on the left, with the Tenth Ohio in the center; companies B and I were thrown out as skirmishers, while the Ninth Ohio and First squadron was stationed in rear as support, with the other two brigades supporting the flanks somewhat thrown back and overlapping. In this position we were dismounted and stood on our horses' heads awaiting the first ray of light to develop the enemy's position. Far away in the distance over the fields we could see the glimmer of his camp-fires. Captain Beebe's battery was placed on the right, thrown forward, while the general and his staff sat upon their horses just in rear.

NO PLACE TO TRADE JACK-KNIVES.  
We had drawn a fresh supply of ammunition and were now retracing our steps by General Sherman's own orders, with instructions to "give Wheeler all the fighting he wanted." Having, during the past week, received some hard blows, we felt confident that the time had come for hot work, and the men seemed hours, the hours, as we waited for the dawn. At the first flush of the morning light our lines were moved forward steadily, until we were within eighty rods of the enemy's lines. Wheeler at once opened on us with his artillery, to which our own quickly replied. Almost the first round from Wheeler's guns severed the staff of Kilpatrick's colors and turning to his staff officers he said: "Boys, this is no place to trade jackknives; give them the saber."

Then the lines moved forward, and coming up within carbine range the charge was sounded. With a cheer the line dashed forward and up to the enemy's works. For a few moments the enemy's fire was terrific. Captain Norton, commanding the right of the advance line, fell from his horse mortally wounded. The Ninety-second, on the left, found marshy ground and were obliged to dismount and make the charge on foot. Being armed with the Spencer seven-shooters, they were always as good as a brigade in a fight; they made the charge, firing rapidly and holding their position close to their works, but the center mounted advance having run against a ditch just in front of their barricade were forced to dismount and fill it up, taking the rails out of the enemy's works.

THIS CAUSED SOME LITTLE DELAY, during which time the reserve moved up and engaged Anderson's men. As the lines were not over six rods apart, they could not show their guns or their work, but would raise their guns and fire over at random, stubbornly holding their position against odds. Though the crisis of the engagement was with the left and center, the fight was by no means all there. The right was also engaged with Dillrell's and Hume's advance, thrown back in the head of the creek and protected from view by the underbrush that lined the stream. Beebe's battery was brought up and put in position near the cut by the railroad, to which Wheeler's guns replied from the other side of the creek. By the time the center had filled the ditch several breaks had been made in the barricades, where the line was ordered to mount and charge through. Up to this time Anderson's men had held their ground stubbornly, but when they saw that our center had broken through, and with a cheer were moving to their rear, from their right and left, they threw down their arms and started on the run to the rear to regain their old horses which were some distance back. But this they found it impossible to do. Kilpatrick, leading the charge, dashed in upon their horses, which became frightened and stampeded, and such as did not cross the creek were captured. Most of Anderson's brigade were taken prisoners. Wheeler, supposing that Anderson could hold his line, had crossed with re-enforcements for the center and his left. They were deploying when their right broke. Atkins at once advanced upon their left, driving them back and across the creek in confusion. We could see an officer dashing down the line with his saber raised, and hear his voice, calling on his "brave men" to "stand and fight the invaders."

This officer, we afterwards learned from the prisoners, was General Wheeler. His lines were broken at every point, and, following up the advantage, Kilpatrick crossed the creek at three places, drove Wheeler's forces through the town for eight miles, after which he returned, destroying the railroad bridge at Briar Creek. Wheeler admits that it was with difficulty he "succeeded in withdrawing" from his position at Waynesboro', but seeks to take off the edge of his chagrin by reporting that he was attacked by the Fourteenth Corps, as well as by Kilpatrick's cavalry. Baird's division was not engaged during the day, but its presence and close support, no doubt, assisted Kilpatrick by enabling him to make more decisive movements than he otherwise would have attempted.

WHAT GENERAL SHERMAN SAYS.  
General Sherman, in his Memoirs, thus describes the engagement: "While the left wing was marching toward Louisville, north of the railroad, General Kilpatrick had, with his cavalry division, moved rapidly toward Waynesboro', on the branch railroad leading from Millen to Augusta. He found Wheeler's division of rebel cavalry there, and had considerable skirmishing with it, but, hearing that our prisoners had been removed two days before from the engagement at Reynolds' plantation, on the 28th, he returned to Louisville on the 30th, where he found the left wing. Here he remained a couple of days to rest his horses, and receiving orders from me to engage Wheeler and give him all the fighting he wanted, he procured from General Slocum the assistance of the infantry division of General Baird, and moved back to Waynesboro' on the 3d of December. Near Waynesboro' Wheeler was again encountered and driven through the town and beyond Briar Creek toward Augusta, thus keeping up the delusion that the main army was moving towards Augusta. General Kilpatrick's fighting movements about Waynesboro' and Briar Creek were spied on, and he succeeded a good effect by relieving the infantry column and the wagon-trains of all molestation during their march on Millen. Having thus covered that flank, he turned south, and followed the movements of the Fourteenth Corps to Buckhead Church, north of Millen and near it. \* \* \* No enemy opposed us, and we could only occasionally hear the faint reverberations of a gun to our left rear, where we knew that General Kilpatrick was skirmishing with Wheeler's cavalry, which persistently followed him."

(To be continued.)

ends were forced to dismount and fill it up, taking the rails out of the enemy's works.

ANDERSON'S BRIGADE CAPTURED.  
This caused some little delay, during which time the reserve moved up and engaged Anderson's men. As the lines were not over six rods apart, they could not show their guns or their work, but would raise their guns and fire over at random, stubbornly holding their position against odds. Though the crisis of the engagement was with the left and center, the fight was by no means all there. The right was also engaged with Dillrell's and Hume's advance, thrown back in the head of the creek and protected from view by the underbrush that lined the stream. Beebe's battery was brought up and put in position near the cut by the railroad, to which Wheeler's guns replied from the other side of the creek. By the time the center had filled the ditch several breaks had been made in the barricades, where the line was ordered to mount and charge through. Up to this time Anderson's men had held their ground stubbornly, but when they saw that our center had broken through, and with a cheer were moving to their rear, from their right and left, they threw down their arms and started on the run to the rear to regain their old horses which were some distance back. But this they found it impossible to do. Kilpatrick, leading the charge, dashed in upon their horses, which became frightened and stampeded, and such as did not cross the creek were captured. Most of Anderson's brigade were taken prisoners. Wheeler, supposing that Anderson could hold his line, had crossed with re-enforcements for the center and his left. They were deploying when their right broke. Atkins at once advanced upon their left, driving them back and across the creek in confusion. We could see an officer dashing down the line with his saber raised, and hear his voice, calling on his "brave men" to "stand and fight the invaders."

This officer, we afterwards learned from the prisoners, was General Wheeler. His lines were broken at every point, and, following up the advantage, Kilpatrick crossed the creek at three places, drove Wheeler's forces through the town for eight miles, after which he returned, destroying the railroad bridge at Briar Creek. Wheeler admits that it was with difficulty he "succeeded in withdrawing" from his position at Waynesboro', but seeks to take off the edge of his chagrin by reporting that he was attacked by the Fourteenth Corps, as well as by Kilpatrick's cavalry. Baird's division was not engaged during the day, but its presence and close support, no doubt, assisted Kilpatrick by enabling him to make more decisive movements than he otherwise would have attempted.